

Refining the Common Criteria for Objective and Predictable Security Measurement

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Today's Situation

Common Criteria offers significant value

- Internationally agreed to process
- International reciprocity

Common Criteria has significant limitations

- Focuses almost all measurement on product security functionality & structure
- Provides almost no objective measurement of actual security (vulnerability) of the product
 - What little objective measurement it does contain is very ambiguous and mostly left up to each lab to define
 - Very difficult to predict or scope effectively
 - Left unsure of what results actually mean



Desired Goals



- Objectively Measurable Security
 - Measure actual vulnerability of product
 CWE & CAPEC
- Consistency of Analysis from lab to lab and evaluation to evaluation Structured assurance cases utilizing CWE & CAPEC
- Predictable Scope for Evaluations
 Structured assurance cases utilizing CWE & CAPEC







NIAP

- Currently investigating how best to integrate use of CWE, CAPEC & structured assurance cases
- Focusing more on the upfront elements of CC (PPs & STs)
- First steps currently underway in the form of a new, more structured protection profile for firewalls

ISO/IEC

 TR 20004 utilizing CWE, CAPEC & structured assurance cases to refine ISO/IEC 15408 & ISO/IEC 18045


Common Criteria Development Board (CCDB)

- Evaluating and planning how best to integrate CWE, CAPEC & structured assurance cases
- Collaborating in ISO efforts with a plan to incorporate the results into CCDB policy & guidance













ISO/IEC 20004 Approach

Avoid politics as much as possible

- Author an ISO/IEC Technical Report (TR) rather than attempt to revise the actual standards
- Work incrementally to minimize resistance to change
- Collaborate and coordinate among the authoritative players (ISO, CCDB & NIAP)



A Brief History of ISO/IEC 20004



- A New Work Item Proposal (NWIP) was prepared by the US Delegation in preparation for the April 2010 SC27 meetings in Melaka Malaysia
 - Atypically, this NWIP was an actual full draft of a document
- NWIP was presented and discussed in Melaka with very positive review and input from several other national bodies
- Working Draft 1 (WD1) was prepared based on the comments from Melaka and submitted for review at the Oct 2010 SC27 meetings in Berlin, Germany
- WD1 was discussed in Berlin with support and input from several national bodies (US, UK, Sweden, France, Germany, Japan, Korea)
- Working Draft 2 (WD2) will be finished this week and submitted for discussion at the April 2011 SC27 meetings in Singapore
- Goal is to have first iteration finalized and published by late 2011 or early 2012



In a nutshell, what does this version contain?



- Introduces CWE as one of the standard resources for identifying and specifying relevant vulnerabilities (weaknesses)
 - Filters relevancy based on technical context and maturity of CWEs as well as effectively implemented mitigations
- Introduces CAPEC attack patterns as a mechanism to objectively characterize attack potential in relation to relevant vulnerabilities and to support the specification of relevant security/penetration tests
 - Filters relevancy based on technical context and maturity of CAPECs as well as effectively implemented mitigations
- Introduces concept that in the future evaluations may be specified utilizing PPs or STs based on structured assurance cases
- Specifies that penetration tests carried out as part of the evaluation should identify the CWE being tested for, the CAPEC being instantiated and the detailed attack execution flow being carried out





What is planned for the next revision after publication?

- Introduce weakness identification and analysis activities (e.g. secure code review, architectural risk analysis) in addition to penetration testing
- More comprehensively and formally integrate in the concept and use of structured assurance cases

